Mixing modular addition (+) with exclusive-or (⊕) is extensively used in design of symmetric ciphers as the operations are very fast and their combination is non-linear over GF(2). The paper investigates the strength of modular addition against differential cryptanalysis (DC) where the differences of inputs and outputs are expressed as XOR. In particular, we solve two very frequently used equations (1) 
Introduction
Addition and XOR. Mixing two different group operations is a common technique adopted by the designers of symmetric ciphers to make cryptanalysis difficult. The main reason behind the wide use of mixing modular addition (or simply addition) with XOR is their high speed on modern machines and their non-linearity over GF (2) . Helix [8] , IDEA [14] , Mars [3] , RC6 [19] , Twofish [20] and the MD-family of hash functions are a few applications of addition and XOR. Plenty of research has also been spent on analyzing behaviors of addition, XOR and their mixing. Staffelbach and Meier worked on determination of the probability distribution of the carry for integer addition [21] . Wallén investigated the linear approximations of modular addition [23] . Lipmaa et al. dealt with the equation (x + y) ⊕ ((x ⊕ α) + (y ⊕ β)) = γ and its dual to investigate the differential properties [15, 16] . Paul and Preneel showed that the satisfiability of an arbitrary set differential equations of addition is in the complexity class P and designed algorithms to solve them efficiently [18] .
Batch and Adaptive Queries. Cryptologic analogue of a query is a plaintext (or a ciphertext depending on the mode of attack). Similarly, attacks based on batch and adaptive queries are equivalent to chosen plaintext (CP) attack and adaptive chosen plaintext (ACP) attack respectively. A CP attack is more practical than the corresponding ACP attack because, in the latter case, we assume the attacker to be powerful enough to submit queries adaptively, i.e., the next query is submitted based on the answers to the previous queries -a situation which is difficult to implement in practice. There is a large number of research papers launching CP and ACP attacks on many practical ciphers. For example, the boomerang attack introduced by Wagner is an ACP attack [22] and, therefore, less practical. The slide attacks by Biryukov and Wagner can be implemented using both CP and ACP but with different amount of data and time [5] . The time-memory trade-off attack by Hellman [9] and the differential attack on DES by Biham and Shamir [4] are CP attacks; so they are attributed more practical importance. In this paper we will deal with a very frequently encountered set of equations in secret key cryptography, known as differential equations of addition (explained in the next paragraph), to solve them with a set of batch queries (equivalent to a CP attack).
Summary of the Results. Addition mod 2 n is extensively used as a block cipher component. Differential Cryptanalysis (DC) is one of the most powerful attacks against block ciphers [4] . In this paper we investigate the security of addition under DC. In particular, we deal with the following two equations where differences of inputs and outputs of addition are expressed as exclusive-or
These equations are known as differential equations of addition (DEA). In course of cryptanalysis of MD5, Berson observed in 1992 that, for large n, it is hard to analyze modular addition when differences are expressed as XOR [2] . The apparent difficulty to analyze combination of addition and XOR seems to justify its widespread application in symmetric cryptography. The solution to the above equations with adaptive queries (an (α, β) is a query) was first given in [17] and subsequently improved to optimality in [18] . However, a nontrivial solution with a set of batch queries remained elusive (the problem, which was raised in [18] , is elaborated in Section 2). As argued before, solution with adaptive queries is easy and less practical because of the assumption of more powerful adversary. This paper solves the equations with batch queries. Our algorithm solves (1) with 2 n−2 queries where a lower bound on the number of queries is 3 4 · 2 n−2 (for all n > 3), i.e., the lower bound is optimal up to a constant factor of 4 3 . This exponential lower bound constitutes an important theoretical reference point which endorses the equations's strong resistance against DC. On the other hand, (2) has been solved with only 6 (for all n > 2) queries which is two more than a conjectured lower bound (note that the total number of queries is 2 2n ) -this fact shows a major cryptographic weakness of addition under DC and therefore, this component should be used with caution. In practical cryptanalysis, using these results we are successful to recover the secret key of a recently proposed stream cipher Helix [8] , which was a candidate for consideration in the 802.11i standard, with 2 35.64 chosen plaintexts which has so far been the only CP attack on this cipher (the earlier attack was an ACP attack [17] ). In view of plenty of applications of addition and XOR, our analyses seem suitable to evaluate cryptographic strength of many ciphers. In addition, solutions to the above equations emerge as typical tasks in many branches of mathematics and computers science such as combinatorics, Boolean algebra, computational complexity. For example, the results may be useful to solve equations involving modular multiplication and T -functions [12, 11] . Last but not the least, the technique used to derive all the results of this article, is purely combinatorial and easier than the traditional algebraic methods to solve multivariate polynomial equations such as Gröbner bases and its variants [1, 7] .
Notation
The ith bit of an n-bit integer l is denoted by l i (l 0 denotes the least significant bit or the 0th bit of l). The operation addition modulo 2 n over Z 2 n can be viewed as a binary operation over Z n 2 (we denote this operation by '+') using the bijection that maps (
The symbols '⊕' and '∧' denote the operations bit-wise exclusive-or and bit-wise and of two n-bit integers respectively. We will denote a ∧ b by ab. Throughout the paper, [p, q] denotes a set containing all integers between the integers p and q including both of them. Unless otherwise stated, n denotes a positive integer. The size of a set S is denoted by |S|. 2 The Problem: Solving DEA with Batch Queries
In Sect. 1, we already gave the motivation for solving the following two differential equations of addition
where x, y are the only fixed unknown variables. In the present context, solving (3) is understood to be solving the set of all 2 2n equations generated by ranging (α, β) with the corresponding γ for a fixed unknown (x, y) (for (4) the number of all equations is 2 n ). Such an (α, β) is referred to as a query. The number of solutions satisfying all 2 2n equations is no more than that of any subset of the equations. Therefore, solving these 2 2n equations reduces the search space of the secret (x, y) to the minimum. This fact is the main motivation for dealing with all 2 2n equations. The most captivating question that follows immediately is that whether it is possible to solve a subset of the 2 2n equations and obtain the same solution as that of the entire 2 2n equations. Therefore, our problem is an optimization problem which focuses on minimizing the number of equations to solve (3) and (4). In cryptographic applications, optimizing the number of equations to solve DEA can be translated into reduction of the data complexities of many attacks [17] , [18] . Next, we formalize the problem for the sake of easy understanding of many results.
The Power of the Adversary
The power of an adversary that solves (3) is defined as follows.
1. An adversary has unrestricted computational power and an infinite amount of memory.
2. An adversary submits a set of queries {(α, β)} in a batch, to an honest oracle 1 which computes the γ's using the fixed unknown (x, y) in (3) and returns them to the adversary. We will often refer to that fixed (x, y) as the seed of the oracle.
Such an oracle with seed (x, y) is viewed as a mapping O xy : Z n 2 × Z n 2 → Z n 2 and defined by
An adversarial model, similar to the one described above for (3), can be constructed for (4) by setting (α, β) ∈ {0} n × Z n 2 and the mapping O xy : {0} n × Z n 2 → Z n 2 . The model described above represents a practical chosen message attack scenario where the adversary submits queries to an oracle in batch. Based on the replies from the oracle, the adversary computes one or more unknown parameters.
Formalizing the Task: The Useful SetD and the Solution SetD-consistent
Note that |D| = 2 2n and therefore, a character set uniquely represents a set of 2 2n equations if we deal with (3). The aim of the adversary is to find all (x, y) satisfying these 2 2n equations from a subset of the character set D. The set of all such satisfiable (x, y)'s is called D-satisfiable. If we work with (4) then |D| = 2 n . Equivalent Task. Applying the following transformation on a character set D we computeD,
We callD a useful set. Note |D| = 2 2n if (3) is considered. An element (α, β,γ) ∈D corresponds to the following equation
LetD-consistent denote the set of all (x, y)'s satisfying all 2 2n equations corresponding toD. It can be shown that
Therefore, the task is equivalent to determination ofD-consistent from a subset of the useful setD. Note that there is a bijection between D andD. If we deal with (4) then |D| = 2 n .
Equivalent Oracle Output. The oracle output γ on query (α, β) will be adjusted toγ = α ⊕ β ⊕ γ for easy understanding of many deductions.
Rules of the Game. Below, we describe the rules followed by the adversary who determines the set D-consistent. The essence of the whole problem is brought out in the following points.
1. The adversary starts with no information about x and y except their size n.
2. The adversary submits a set of queries (α, β)'s in a batch, irrespective of the seed (x, y). The oracle returns to the adversary the set ofγ's corresponding to the queries and the chosen (x, y).
3. The adversary fails if, with the submitted queries, she is unable to computeD-consistent for 
Preliminary Work: Computing the Number of Solutions
Before embarking on designing algorithms to solve the equations, we first establish the number of all solutions for different seeds (x, y)'s, i.e., the size ofD-consistent (see Sect. 2.2 for the definition). We follow a series of steps (Sect. 3.1 and 3.2) leading up to the formulation ofD-consistent in Sect. 3.3. We shall heavily use the results of this section to obtain two important contributions of the paper: (i) lower bounds on the number of queries (described in Sect. 4) and (ii) the proofs of correctness of our algorithms which computesD-consistent (explained in Sect. 5). The results of this section are provided in [18] . However, to make the paper self-contained, we include them.
Step 1: Relation among Input Bits
Let A ⊆D whereD is a useful set. Take an arbitrary element (α, β,γ) ∈ A (n > 1). Observe thatγ i+1 can be computed using only the preceding bits
, from the following three equations
where c i is the carry at the ith position of (x + y), Table 1 lists the values ofγ i+1 as computed from all values of
Step 2 : Computation of Parameters
We now determine an important quantity, denoted by G i , for nonempty A ⊆D. In G i , we store the ith and (i + 1)th bits ofγ and the ith bit of α and β for all (α, β,γ) ∈ A. We call G i the ith core of A. More formally (suppose n > 1), 
Col (1) Col (2) Col (3) Col (4) Col (5) Col (6) Col (7) Col (8) We now discuss what the expression " Table 1 , find the row(s) of the fourth coordinateγ i+1 in the column specified by the first three coordinates (α i , β i ,γ i ) in R(0) and put them in set
}. Now, we show a fundamental relation between S i, 0 and S i, 1 that will be used to obtain several results.
Proposition 1 For all nonempty set A ⊆D and all
We set,
The example, provided below, will also ease the understanding of the subsequent results. (6)). Now, from Table 1 ,
Step 3 (final): Formulation of the Size ofD-consistent
Let A ⊆D. The definition of A-consistent which denotes the set of all (x, y)'s satisfying the equations represented by A is a natural extension of the definition ofD-consistent. The general formula for the number of solutions for any given set of DEA (the set may not contain all possible equations) is shown in the following proposition (the proof is given in Appendix A.4).
Proposition 2 Let A = φ and S denote |A-consistent|. Then,
The S i 's are defined in (7) . Now, as we are interested in the size of |D-consistent| for (4) and (3), we obtain the results in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 as special cases of Proposition 2.
Theorem 1 Let the position of the least significant '1' of x in the equation
Using the procedure described in Sect. 3.2, we construct the ith core
, from the useful setD. We derive that
In the above equations,
Note that only (8) is relevant if t = n − 2. The fact that we are able to extract only the first three coordinates of the elements of G i , ∀i ∈ [0, n − 2], can be proved using the following two auxiliary lemmas, the proofs of which are given in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2 For all
However, only the first three coordinates of the elements of the G i 's are sufficient to determine the S i 's (S i is defined in Sect. 3.2). It is easy to verify from Table 1 that
(ii) The proof is similar to the above one using Proposition 2.
Theorem 2 Let a useful setD be given for the equation
Proof. The proof is similar to the above proof. Details are provided in Appendix A.2.
Lower Bounds on the Number of Queries
Armed with the results derived in the previous section, we are now ready to establish one of the major contributions of this article, i.e., lower bounds on the number of queries, submitted in a batch, to solve the said equations. As it is already clear from the previous discussion that the trivial method is to submit all possible queries and then solve it; the challenge lies with a nontrivial solution which uses less number of queries. It is always regarded as an important theoretical benchmark as to how far it is possible to reduce the number of queries. The significance of a lower bound is that no algorithm can solve the equations with queries less than it. We already noticed that more queries tend to reduce the search space of the secret (x, y). In our formal framework, if A ⊆ B ⊆D thenD-consistent ⊆ B-consistent ⊆ A-consistent. This implies that |D-consistent| ≤ |B-consistent| ≤ |A-consistent|. Note that our algorithm constructs A ⊆D, ∀(x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 , using the submitted queries and the corresponding outputs such that |D-consistent| = |A-consistent|. The algorithm fails if |D-consistent| < |A-consistent|, for some (x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 . We will use the condition -|A-consistent| cannot be strictly greater than |D-consistent| -to compute a lower bound on the number of queries. In Theorem 3 we identify a property of A, in terms of the (n − 3)th core G n−3 , where the above condition is violated. In Theorem 4, we use this fact to obtain a lower bound.
Theorem 3 We consider the equation
(x + y) ⊕ (x + (y ⊕ β)) = γ ,
where the position of the least significant '1' of x is t with n − 3 ≥ t ≥ 0. Let all the submitted queries and the oracle outputs be stored in the set A (note that φ ⊂ A ⊆D whereD is a useful set). Suppose that there is no query (0, β) for which the oracle output isγ withγ
Proof. If there is no query (0, β) for which the oracle output isγ withγ n−2 = 1 then the (n−3)th core G n−3 (corresponding to A) contains no element (0, β n−3 ,γ n−3 ,γ n−2 ) withγ n−2 = 1. This implies G n−2 contains no element (0, β n−2 ,γ n−2 ,γ n−1 ) withγ n−2 = 1 . Therefore, G n−2 is of one of the following forms, Table 1 , S n−2 = 2 l for either of the cases, where l > 0. Similarly, using Theorem 1,
Instead of establishing a lower bound for the entire seed space Z n 2 × Z n 2 , we derive a lower bound for a subset of Z n 2 × Z n 2 , denoted by V n, 0 which is the collection of all (x, y)'s with x 0 = 1 (that is, the position of the least significant '1' of x is zero). Note that |V n, 0 | = 2 2n−1 . It is easy to conclude that the lower bound derived for V n, 0 is also a lower bound for the entire seed space Z n 2 × Z n 2 .
Theorem 4 A lower bound on the number of queries (0, β)'s, submitted in a batch, to solve
(x + y) ⊕ (x + (y ⊕ β)) = γ where (x, y) ∈ V n, 0 is (i) 3 · 2 n−4 if n ≥ 4, (ii) 2 if n = 3, (iii) 1 if n = 2 and (iv) 0 if n = 1.
Proof. (i)
When n ≥ 4. Let all the submitted queries and the oracle outputs be stored in the set A (φ ⊂ A ⊆D whereD is a useful set) and |A-consistent| = |D-consistent| for all (x, y) ∈ V n, 0 . By Theorem 3, a necessary condition is that there must exist at least one query (0, β) for which the oracle output isγ withγ n−2 = 1 otherwise |A-consistent| > |D-consistent|. We shall henceforth denote a query (0, β) by β. We first encode the bit-string of a query β as the edges and the corresponding outputγ as the nodes (denoted by circles) on a path of the full binary tree as shown in Fig. 1 . The possible values of β i are denoted as the edges of the tree between the depth i and the depth (i + 1) (the root of the tree is at depth 0). Similarly the possible values ofγ i can be assigned to the nodes at the depth i. Note that all possible 2 n queries are encoded in the tree. The Approach. We shall isolate a subtree and show that, if an arbitrary path in that subtree is not present as the prefix of one of the submitted queries then there exists a seed (x, y) ∈ V n, 0 such that, on all other queries, the outputs areγ's withγ n−2 = 0. Therefore a lower bound is the number of all paths present in that particular subtree.
Node Assignment Rule. The rule shows how to select the values ofγ's for all the queries. In the nodes of the entire tree we now put the values ofγ. We select an arbitrary path P (which is a prefix of a query) in the subtree whose leaf nodes are at the depth (n − 2) and whose first two edges are (0, 1) and (1, 0) and (1, 1) (see Fig. 1 ). Note that the values at the nodes B and C will be 0 and 1 respectively because x 0 = 1. Now we put 1 in all nodes on the path P from the depth 2 till the depth (n − 2). The two child nodes D and D of the last node on P are assigned 0 and 1 arbitrarily. All other nodes in the tree are assigned 0. The intuition that such an assignment rule gives a valid solution is derived from an observation in Table 1 (see Sect. 3.1) that the matrix cut off by rows R(1), R(2) and R(3) and columns Col(2), Col(3) and Col(4) has only diagonal elements 1 (formally proved in Lemma 3).
Proof Continued. Suppose P is not a prefix of any query in A. As shown in Fig. 1 , all nodes at depth (n − 2), except the one on the path P , are assigned zero. Therefore, there is no query β in A such that the corresponding outputγ hasγ n−2 = 1. This leads to a contradiction. Therefore, there must be a query in A whose prefix is P . Now P is an arbitrary path in the subtree constructed above. Now the total number of paths (or prefixes of queries) in the subtree is 3 · 2 n−4 . The following lemma completes the proof. P with the first two edges (0, 1) or (1, 0) or (1, 1) in the tree constructed above, all queries and their outputs encoded in the tree according to the Node Assignment Rule, produce a valid solution (x, y) ∈ V n, 0 .
Lemma 3 For any arbitrary
Proof. For any arbitrary P , the core G i 's (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 2), computed from the values ofγ's and β's (according to the Node Assignment Rule), are of one of the following forms 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, a i ), (0, 1, 1, b Table 1 using the G i 's). Therefore, the number of valid solutions S = 4 · n−2 i=0 S i > 0 (see Proposition 2). In fact the number solutions is 8 (verification of a part of Theorem 1). The proofs of (ii), (iii) and (iv) are immediate from Table 1 .
Lower Bound for the equation
For the equation lower bounds on the number of batch queries, for n = 2 and 3, are 2 and 3 respectively. This can be proved by searching through all possible x, y, α, β andγ exhaustively. However, the situation becomes intractable when n ≥ 4 when the number of all possible x, y, α, β andγ for only 3 queries becomes extremely large (2 60 for n = 4). We did extensive experiments with many test vectors and found that three queries were insufficient to solve the equations when n ≥ 4. We state the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1 A lower bound on the number of queries (α, β), submitted in a batch, to solve
(x + y) ⊕ ((x ⊕ α) + (y ⊕ β)) = γ is 4 if n ≥ 4.
Algorithms
In this section, we present two algorithms Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 to solve (4) and (3) with a set of batch queries. The inputs to the algorithms are the bit-length n, the oracle O and the Table 1 . The outputs are the G i 's (defined in Sect. 3.2) computed from a set of queries and their replies. Our target is to select a subset of all possible queries such that the set of solutions derived from the G i 's is the same asD-consistent, for all (x, y)'s. Algorithm to compute the actual solution set from the set of G i 's is described in Appendix A.3. Below we discuss the motivation and correctness of the algorithms; we leave many smaller details, while the pseudocode covers all cases.
Discussion: Algorithm 1(sketch). The number of queries required by the algorithm is 2 n−2 which is one fourth of all possible 2 n queries (note that a lower bound in For all t ∈ [1, n − 3] in increasing order 9: {Initialize Q = φ 10:
For all β ∈ Q 11: bigger loop we submit a set of queries which ensures that G t = { (0, 1, 1, a), (0, 0, 1, b) , (0, 1, 0, c)} which implies that S t = 1. The tth iteration also produces at least one outputγ withγ t+1 = 1 which will be used in the next loop. If there is no output withγ t+1 = 1 then S t+1 > 1 and hence the algorithm fails (see Theorem 3). The proof of correctness of the algorithm when x 0 = 1 is similar to the above argument.
Discussion: Algorithm 2 (sketch). The number of queries required by the algorithm is 6 which is two more than the best known lower bound (also note that the number of all possible queries is 2 2n ). The proof of correctness of this algorithm is by showing that the submitted queries produce S i = 1 for all i ∈ [0, n − 2] (Theorem 2). Six queries are submitted in steps 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14 . Now we consider only the first two queries in steps 3 and 5. For these queries, Table 1 ). Also observe that
Next, we observe a combinatorial pattern in the precomputed Table 1 which shows that, if S i = 2 then S i−1 = 1 (omitting proof). The 3rd and the 4th queries are generated from the second query assuming S i = 2 for some odd i's. We change all the even numbered bits of the second query (α [2] , β [2] ). It can be shown that making (α [2] i , β [2] i ) = (0, 0) and (1, 1) for all even i's ensures that S i = 1 for all odd i's. Exactly the same way the 5th and the 6th queries are generated from the second query (α [2] , β [2] ) assuming that S i = 2 for some even i's. Now we change the odd numbered bits of (α [2] , β [2] ) to (0, 0) and (1, 1) to ensure that all S i = 1 for all even i's. Therefore, the number of solutions derived from these 6 queries is S = 4 · n−2 i=0 S i = 4 as suggested in Theorem 2. [4] , β [4] ); /*Oracle Output*/ 12: (α [5] , β [5] ) = ((· · · 000000) n , (· · · 010101) n );/*Fifth Query*/ 13:γ [5] = O(α [5] , β [5] ); /*Oracle Output*/ 14: (α [6] , β [6] 
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to solve the equation (x + y)
;/*Sixth Query*/ 15:γ [6] = O(α [6] , β [6] ); /*Oracle Output*/ 16:
Cryptographic Applications
Strength of modular addition against DC. In view of the large scale application of modular addition in symmetric cryptography, our results seem effective in the evaluation of security of cipher components which mixes two different group operations addition and XOR. The fact that only 6 queries submitted in a batch (which is a more practical attack scenario than adaptive queries) are sufficient to reduce the search space of the secret (x, y) from 2 2n to only 4 (for all n ≥ 4) should be recognized as a warning to the designers (see Algorithm 2) . On the other hand the high exponential lower bound on the number of queries for another differential equation of addition (3 · 2 n−4 for all n ≥ 4) underlines an important theoretical reference point which advocates it as relatively stronger under DC (see Theorem 4) . One direct application of our results in practical cryptanalysis is described below. At this moment, we are not aware of other applications of the results, yet it can very likely be used to evaluate cryptographic strengths of many modern ciphers which use modular multiplication combined with modular addition and XOR.
Cryptanalysis of Helix. Helix, proposed by Ferguson et al. [8] , is a stream cipher with a combined MAC functionality. This cipher was a candidate for consideration in the 802.11i standard. The main component of the primitive is combination of addition and XOR. The fact that the internal state of Helix depends on the plaintext allows for cryptanalysis with chosen plaintexts (CP) and adaptive chosen plaintext (ACP). Muller mounted an ACP attack which recovers the secret key of the Helix cipher with 2 12 plaintexts. We refer the readers to [17] for a detailed analysis of the attack. Our key recovery attack goes on the same line as Muller's attack. We cannot describe the attack in full detail because of space constraints, however, we pick out a portion which is critical to our CP attack. The crux of the whole attack is solving the equation (x + y) ⊕ (x + (y ⊕ β)) = γ with β's and the corresponding γ's to recover the secret information (x, y), in the framework described in Sect. 2.1, for 50 times (n = 32 for the Helix cipher). Every time β corresponds to a CP. Algorithm 1 shows that the above equation can be solved with 2 n−2 CP's (2 30 for n = 32). Therefore, the total data complexity of our CP attack is 50 · 2 30 , i.e., 2 35.64 plaintexts. Note. Apparently, from the quantities of the required plaintexts, it may look that our attack is less effective than Muller's attack. However, comparison between a CP and an ACP attack in terms of data complexities is unjustified. On the other hand, the working principles a CP attack makes it more practical than an ACP attack. It was not known till now how to mount a CP attack on the Helix cipher and its data complexity.
Conclusion and Further Research
The results of the paper contribute to both theory and practice. We showed a lower bound on the number of batch queries to solve a DEA which is optimal up to a constant factor. For solving another DEA, our algorithm uses number of queries which is constant asymptotically. Our results are used directly to recover the key of the Helix cipher with chosen plaintexts rather than adaptive chosen plaintexts which has so far been the best CP attack on this cipher. The paper also leaves many interesting questions open. One possible research direction may be to close the gap between the lower and upper bounds on the number of queries to solve DEA. Another way to extend the work is to analyze components which combine more complex transformations such as modular multiplication, T -functions with addition.
